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THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY
REFORM ON LABOR LAW:
REDRESSING THE HISTORICAL BALANCE
Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

A key element in the Reagan Administration's program for
economic recovery is the reduction of the regulatory burden. The
public focus of this effort has been to reduce costs on business
imposed by ineffective and unnecessary- Federal regulations. The
1
rationale, in terms of the economic recovery program, is clear. In
recent years, the costs of federally imposed regulations have been
estimated to account for more than 10 percent of total business
investment. 2 These costs, as well as the uncertain future and
direction of certain regulatory programs, have contributed to business
uncertainty and diverted investment capital from expanding
productive capacity. Because some of these costs are not imposed on
foreign manufacturers who export to the U.S., they also contribute to
the decline in the ability of U.S. manufacturers to successfully
compete in an increasingly global marketplace.
The Reagan Administration's efforts to reduce the costs of
3
regulation have received considerable attention. Some commentators characterize- the Administration's regulatory "reform" program
as merely a thinly disguised effort to dismantle important social (as
opposed to economic) regulations that took decades of hard-fought
regulatory battles to establish. These critics view this "dismantling" as
a victory for socially insensitive business elements which are
motivated solely by the desire to expand profit margins. In short, the
government's policy of reducing regulatory costs is seen as a
*Under Secretary of Labor.
1. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, President Reagan's
Initiatives to Reduce Regulatory Burdens, (Feb. 18, 1981).
2. For a discussion of this subject see, M.L. WEIDENBAUM, GOVERNMENT MANDATED
PRICE INCREASES (1975); Weidenbaum & DeFina, The Cost of FederalRegulation of Economic
Activity, RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 88 (1978) (available from American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy); ARTHUR ANDERSON & CO., COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION STUDY FOR
THE BUSINESS ROUND TABLE, (1979).
3. See, e.g., Guzzardi, Reagan's Reluctant Deregulators, FORTUNE, (Mar. 8, 1982);
Regulation - the First Year, REGULATION, (Jan./Feb. 1982).
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reactionary attempt to weaken or eliminate needed employee
protections, which would not exist without governmental intervention. In reality, however, the opposite is true. Regulatory reform is a
major key to continued social progress in America and to the
preservation of the U.S. standard of living. This paper will address
the impact of regulatory reform upon labor law and labor relations.
FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR LAW

18th Century to New Deal
In order to understand the regulatory reform approach taken by
this Administration, we must first understand the historical
antecedents of the regulatory explosion in the 1960's and 1970's. The
industrial revolution brought increased economies of scale to the
production of basic goods, supplanting self-sufficient family farms and
small proprietorships as the primary means of producing goods.
Technological advances in transportation and communications
brought about similar economies of scale to the production of
services. As a result of these changing economic relationships, public
policy, particularly in the 20th century, was primarily concerned with
the relationships between employers and employees. This concern
can be traced through the continual growth of labor legislation and
regulation. Indeed, today, the legal and regulatory relationships
between employers and employees affect the lives of working men
and women more than any other area of the law.
While increased attention to "individual/workplace" or
"employer/employee" relationships dates back to the latter half of the
18th Century, it was during the New Deal that the Federal
Government entered into many areas previously immune from
governmental intervention. The goal of the Roosevelt Administration
was to establish a legal framework and an administrative mechanism
within which representational disputes and collective bargaining
issues could be peacefully resolved. The passage of the NorrisLaGuardia Act4 and the Wagner Act5 effectively guaranteed the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively without
governmental intervention. The Wagner Act left the parties free to
determine and implement, independently, the substantive terms and
conditions of employment. 6
4. Ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
5. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
6. It might be argued that, contrary to this general approach, laws such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act (the FLSA) represented a clear imposition of Federal substantive standards. But a
careful examination of even the FLSA suggests that it was not a deviation from the pattern. The
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Prior to the end of the Second World War, and immediately
thereafter, public support for free collective bargaining was eroded by
a series of bitter work stoppages in key industries. In 1944,
bituminous coal miners struck twice. A nationwide rail strike in 1946
resulted in President Truman's call to draft strikers. In addition,
union protests against wartime wage controls led to a growing public
perception that unions had become too strong and 7that unfettered
collective bargaining could harm the public interest.
As a result of these perceptions, Congress enacted the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,8 more commonly known as
the Taft-Hartley Act. Taft-Hartley, 9 inter alia, stated that certain
practices engaged in by labor organizations had the effect of
burdening commerce. These activities included strikes, secondary
boycotts, hot cargo agreements, and other activities which impaired
the public's interest in the free flow of commerce. During the 1950's,
various industrial disputes occurred; some cases led to demands from
19 A notable
several sectors for immediate Taft-Hartley action.
example of the Act's implementation was President Eisenhower's
obtaining a Taft-Hartley injunction during the lengthy steel industry
strike of 1959. While such governmental intervention arguably
altered the bargaining process, it nevertheless represented action
aimed at policing the "rules of the road." The government's primary
concern was the impact of strikes on the national economy, not the
outcome of a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, Taft-Hartley did
not alter the substantive rights of employers and employees.
The 1960's and 1970's
During the 1960's and early 1970's the focus of public labor
policy shifted from one of defining the procedures for selfFLSA did impose substantive wage and hour thresholds below which no employer/employee
agreement could be made, but beyond this it did not interfere with the bargaining process. Like
most New Deal labor legislation, the FLSA was consistent with the general approach; namely,
to specify only the general parameters whereby employers and employees could govern
themselves, with the government providing a framework for self-government. Indeed, much of
the debates surrounding the establishment of a minimum wage approached the issue in terms of
the National Economic Recovery Program. By establishing a minimum wage many felt that
more income would be generated in the economy from wages leading to increased demand and
ultimately to increased employment. See 29 U.S.C, § 201 (1976).
7. See D.E. CULLEN, NATIONAL EMERGENCY DISPUTES (1968) (available from N.Y.S.
School of Industrial Labor Relations, Cornell University); H.R. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES (1966).

8. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
9. Id.
10. The Taft-Hartley Act provided for a labor injunction. However, the Act limited its use
only against an unfair labor practice and only by a demand of an official of the National Labor
Relations Board.
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government and fine tuning the balance between employer and
employee relationships to one of establishing the rights of individual
workers. Initially, the extension of Federal regulatory activity was
seen as a practical way to address and to resolve labor issues which
appeared to require a Federal presence or authority. The use of the
regvlatory approach in resolving such issues was viewed as a speedy,
uniform, and relatively inexpensive procedure for dealing with such
intractable issues as worker health and safety,11 civil rights,1 2 and
pension protection. 13 Not only would the regulatory approach
facilitate the power to adjudicate, it would also provide a mechanism
whereby the government could initiate proceedings, investigate, and
prosecute with the force of law. All of these elements were critical in
dealing with interactions between employers and employees in areas
involving scientific, medical, financial, and actuarial factors.
Almost imperceptibly these actions moved the Federal
Government directly into the process of determining the outcome of
disputes rather than the rules by which such outcomes would be
determined between employers and employees. The effect of
governmental intervention in the private market was to create a
variety of "perceived" rights: ranging from the right to be free from
discrimination to the right to work in a healthy and safe place with a
secure pension. Once these perceived rights were established,
federal bureaucracies were created to adjudicate and enforce them.
This central role of government seriously weakened the earlier
approach, which relied primarily on direct intervention between
employers and employees, or on collective bargaining mechanisms.
The latter part of the 1970's was a period of substantial regulatory
activity in which the Government sought to implement the vast array
of new regulatory legislative programs.14 In the area of labor law, the
scope of this activity was very broad including issues of health and
safety, 15 pension rights, 1 6 discrimination, hiring practices, 17 and
wage rate determinations.' 8 In conclusion, governmental intervention weakened free employer-employee bargaining.

11. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
13. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
14. M.L. WEIDENBAUM, GOVERNMENT MANDATED PRICE INCREASES Table 1 Extension
of Government Regulations of Business 1962-73, at 4-6 (1975).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 651.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
17. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol1/iss1/3

4

Reform
Impact of
Lovell: The Impact
ofRegulatory
Regulatory
Reform on Labor Law: Redressing the Hist

Limitations of the Regulatory Approach
The increased use of the power of the Federal Government to
determine substantive rights through law and regulation, combined
with more enlightened personnel practices by large employers,
should have pointed the way towards resolving many of the problems
in the workplace. However, this was not the case. Some critics argued
that the regulatory programs, in some areas, .had been a dismal
failure. Others argued that considerable progress had been made.
While objective measurement is difficult, it would be fair to say that,
on balance, progress has occurred. 19 But, the price of this progress
only recently has been evident. The real costs of regulation are
illustrated in the increased time which companies must expend in
order to complete the numerous forms and to comply with other
complex governmental barriers to ordinary transactions.
The effects of superimposing a rigid federal structure on private
industry can be seen also in the economic competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturers and their tendency towards large scale operation. The
proliferation of regulations has created a new regulatory economy of
a substantial
scale. A manufacturer with a large unit volume derives
20
competitors.
smaller
over
advantage
unit
cost per
Rather than resolving the problems, the federal regulatory
process has polarized the parties. 2 1 Employers have typically opposed
regulatory programs because such programs were seen as
representing additional intrusions into areas where employers have
had some freedom with trade unions. They argue that the rigidity of
the regulations make such regulations ineffective by not allowing for
creative solutions better suited to the individual needs of an industry
or a corporation. Small businesses often encountered enormous
administrative difficulties in complying with these regulations.
Proponents of the regulatory approach, however, typically argue that
these problems are attributable to regulatory efforts which have not
gone far enough, either in their scope or their enforcement.
In many instances employees may have benefited from the
protection provided by law; nevertheless, these employees have
found that involvement in the regulatory process itself could be
frustrating and ineffective. The resolution of issues required a
19. For a balanced discussion of this issue, see Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion,
27 LAB. L. J. 67 (1976).
20. Examples of these costs are professional fees for litigation, non-productive capital
expenses, lost opportunity costs, and additional overhead for support staffwithin the corporate
structure.
21. See Chandler, Government versus Business: An American Phenomenon, in BusINEss
AND PUBLIC PoLicY (J. Dunlop ed. 1980).
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complex knowledge of the relevant laws and regulations; few
employees could afford the time and expense of legal counsel to
operate their way through the maze of adjudicatory processes. Thus,
the federal regulatory process had the effect of driving an
unresponsive barrier between the employer and the employee.
Rather than building on the existing systems and using the federal
process only as a court of last resort, the federal regulatory process has
abrogated the traditional and historic institutional mechanisms of
dispute resolution between employers and employees.
Labor organizations initially had been in the forefront of
supporting regulatory programs, particularly in the areas of health
and safety. 2 2 This was evident because unions could gain substantial
benefits, in some areas, through regulations which could achieve
goals, in one nationwide application, which had not been attained
uniformly at the bargaining table. However, as regulatory programs
expanded, some labor organizations expressed opposition to
increased federal regulation in such areas as equal opportunity 23 and
pension reform. 24 These labor organizations sensed the obvious
potential of equal opportunity2 5 and pension regulations2 6 to interfere
with union negotiated seniority and pension plan arrangements. In
addition, to the extent that federal law or regulations comprehensively protect worker welfare, there is less need for workers to be
organized. With safety and health 2 7 and welfare protection 2 8 federally
regulated, there is no necessity for bargaining on these issues.
Notwithstanding some union opposition, various other groups argued
that federal legislation and regulations were required to deal with
these problems because the majority of workers were not represented
by unions.
Governmental regulators, charged with the task of implementing
this vast array of new labor law legislation, were viewed with
dissatisfaction by both employer and employee groups. The
regulators found themselves in an increasingly untenable position
that was resolvable only through the application of more rigid
rulemaking processes. Informal rulemaking required the application
of highly legalistic processes. Lengthy procedural requirements to
rulemaking were specified in the Administrative Procedure Act 29
22. 29 U.S.C. § 651.
23. Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
25. Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 651.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
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which required notice of proposed rulemaking and the development
of a record, 30 made public to all interested parties, from which a final
rule was exclusively derived. Even the rulemaking process was
subject to a system that was designed to prevent mutual
accommodation by the parties affected by the rule. Compromises, if
any, were to be made by governmental regulators acting as impartial
31
judges.
On top of these legislated requirements, governmental
regulatory agencies and Executive review procedures added further
32
layers to the course of promulgating regulations. These procedures
had the effect of further lengthening and weighing down the
rulemaking process, essentially to ensure that all parties affected were
included in the decision-making.
While these procedures have been important in assuring careful
public scrutiny of regulatory proposals, and in assuring the fullest
possible participation of parties affected by the rulemaking process,
they nevertheless fail to address difficulties within the regulatory
process; namely, the possibility of developing a single regulation
capable of dealing with the complexity of situations to which the
regulation must apply in real life situations. Current rulemaking and
adjudicatory procedures do not have mechanisms for continually
adjusting to new and differing situations whereby conflicting interests
can be resolved among affected parties. The incentive to simplify and
reduce regulatory problems to a single set of rules encourages
simplistic thinking about complicated issues; hence, opposing parties
are encouraged to argue their cases before the government in litigious
and adjudicatory proceedings. Legal, administrative, and financial
resources increasingly are being applied to the struggle for or against
or issues which the
a regulation, rather than resolving problems
33
address.
to
proposed legislation sought
Legislation, litigation, and regulation are useful means for
solving certain social and economic problems. But many of these
regulatory approaches also imposed unnecessary costs and failed to
achieve their objectives. The growth of regulations has outstripped
30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (e) and 557.
31. Id. at § 556 (A)(3).
32. In addition to the procedural requirements established in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127-134 (1981), requiring agencies to perform economic analysis of regulations, there is
serious discussion of developing a "regulatory budget" seeking to coordinate all Federal
Government regulatory activity through a process similar to that now used in determining the
Federal budget. See DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION, at 29-44, (Mar./Apr.
1980).
33.

See Schultz, The Abrasive Interface, in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (J. Dunlop ed.

1980).
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our capacity to develop a consensus and mutual accommodation to the
solution of common problems. It is clear that an approach needs to be
developed which operates through improving understanding,
persuasion, accommodation and informal mediation. In short, the
regulatory process, while a valuable tool, needs to be used more in
conjunction with historical institutional mechanisms than as a
substitute for them.
A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATOY REFORM

On February 17, 1981, less than a month after this
Administration came into office, President Ronald Reagan issued an
Executive Order setting out a comprehensive program of regulatory
management. 3 4 The order imposed two major procedures on all
executive branch agencies. First, it required them to conduct
regulatory impact analyses both before publishing proposed rules and
before adopting final rules. 3 5 Second, it required that these analyses
be forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget to assure that
the least burdensome or most cost-effective means of legally
addressing the problem were chosen.3 6
Many observers perceived these new procedures as simply
another element in a long string of procedural requirements in the
promulgation of a regulation. Indeed, a number of serious legal
challenges to the requirements were filed based on the argument that
the process illegally transferred to the Office of Management and
Budget statutory authority rightfully vested only in regulatory
37
agencies.
The procedural requirements of the Executive Order, with their
apparent focus on cost reduction, do not reflect accurately the impact
of the Order in the area of labor regulation. The concept of cost
reduction is not applied as easily to the area of labor regulation as it is
in economic or social regulation. It may be argued that the concept of
"least burdensome" in the area of labor regulation does not allow the
parties sufficient flexibility to resolve their conflicts. Inflexible labor
regulations clearly are overburdensome and ineffective. "Least
burdensome" in the area of social interaction between employers and
employees cannot be measured along a simplistic continuum of
stringent or less stringent, more regulation or less regulation, or
greater or lesser enforcement. The burden or effectiveness of such
34. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127-134 (1981).
35. Id. at 128-130.
36. Id. at 128.
37. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, N.H., 431 A.2d 783 (1981).
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regulations must be measured by an operating framework which
allows the parties flexibility while still addressing the regulatory
problem. The nature of this "least burdensome" aspect in social
regulatory behavior is best seen in specific examples.
OSHA's Hazard Communication and
3
Hearing Conservation Standards 8
The proposed OSHA Hazard Communication Standard,
commonly referred to as the OSHA "labeling" standard, informs
workers of the presence of dangerous chemicals through greatly
improved disclosure procedures. This approach is essentially
"market-oriented" as opposed to the traditional "command and
control" regulatory approach that has been incorporated into most
OSHA standards. 39 The Carter Administration proposal involved
broad labeling coverage of all manufacturing industries. The labels
were to be affixed to virtually all containers, pipes, valves, and
support systems. 40 This labeling approach involved the use of a highly
specific evaluation procedure to determine what constituted a hazard.
The requirement that labeling be used did not grant an effective
means of dealing with the problem of trade secrets. Finally, the
proposed regulation required that extensive record keeping be
maintained for a three year period. Even in the case of an apparent
nonhazardous chemical, the proposed standard required a certification to that effect.
The initial form of the proposed standard, inter alia, mandated
an inflexible set of rules to be applied to every case with little concern
for the potential costs. More importantly, the approach did not
account for the difficulties workers would encounter in acquiring and
utilizing the labeling information effectively. These problems created
doubt about the utility of the standard. However, the agency went
forward with the proposal despite the fact that its estimated costs to
industry were quite onerous.
38. The Hazard Communication Standard was proposed as of March 19, 1982 and can be
found at the Occupational Safety and Health Standard; Hazard Communication Standard, 47
Fed. Reg. 12,119 (1982) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1200) [hereinafter cited as the
Hazard Communication Standard Act]. The Hearing Conservation Standard is found at
Occupational Noise Exposure; Hearing Conservation Amendment, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,639 (1981)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1910) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Amendment].
39. By organizing information in an effective way, the approach allows the respective
parties to choose whether or not the benefits of using hazardous chemicals outweigh their
potential cost and risk. Presumably, the higher the hazard, the fewer the users of such materials
and the attendant reduced demand for the product.
40. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential
Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Part
1990).
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58

The current proposal 41 indicates how costs can be reduced, while
effectiveness is increased, by adopting a flexible regulatory approach.
This revised proposal provides for integrating the labeling provisions
with worker behavior through education and training. Additionally, it
requires chemical manufacturers to assess the hazards of the
chemicals they produce, and to provide such information to their
employees. The Reagan proposal allows compliance plans to be
tailored to specific industries. 4 2 Record keeping requirements also
have been reduced, thereby diminishing costs and helping to prevent
an information overload to workers. In short, the current proposal
integrates cost effective flexibility with the behavioral response of
workers and is thus a standard truly "least burdensome."
A similar case is demonstrated clearly by the original OSHA
worker hearing conservation rule. 4 3 The "noise" standard had a strict
regulatory goal based on scientific findings. Additionally, the standard
permitted employers flexibility in meeting industrial noise requirements. For example, the initial standard specified the precise manner
in which employers were to measure sound levels.A4 The revised
standard simply requires noise monitoring, leaving employers free to
decide whether to monitor the noise exposures of individual workers,
measure general levels at a work station, or use some other method to
determine whether employees are exposed to noise above 85
decibels, the noise level at which significant hearing impairment can
45

occur.

The changes in the standard preserve the major protections
afforded workers by the original amendment. These protections
include monitoring workplace noise levels, mandatory hearing tests
for employees, availability of hearing protectors, and training and
education. The changes clearly allow flexibility in achieving the
regulatory policy goals. This flexibility enables the affected parties to
implement the provisions in an effective manner.
Changes in Regulations under the Davis-Bacon Act 46
The Employment Standards Administration has finalized
changes in the regulations under the Davis-Bacon and related Acts.
Presently, these Acts require contractors working on Federal and
federally-assisted construction jobs to pay the "prevailing" wage rate.
41.
42.

The Hazard Communication Standard Act, supra note 38, at 12,119.
Id. at 12,121.

43.
44.

Hearing Amendment, supra note 38 at 4,078.
Id. at 4,133.

45.
46.

Id. at 42,639.
46 Stat. 1494 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1976).
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The existing regulations often ignored industry practices and imposed
excess costs on the taxpayers by creating a rigid and inflexible
system.4 7 Among the areas addressed by the new regulations are:
(1) restrictions on the use of the helper classifications on these
projects; 48 (2) the method of setting the wage rate on Davis-Bacon
50
jobs; 49 and (3) the requirement for weekly payroll submissions.
A key economic issue involves the current restriction on the
number of nonjourneymen who may work on a project subject to
Davis-Bacon. This procedure does not allow for the flexibility of
recognizing local practices, including the widespread use of helpers.
The revised regulations allow for greater use of semi-skilled
ratio does
classifications. Helpers may be used now as long as 5their
1
journeymen.
three
every
for
helpers
not exceed two
Another important economic concern involves the use of the "30
percent rule." The Department previously defined the "prevailing"
wage as that paid to at least 30 percent of the workers in a locality,
assuming that no single rate was paid to a majority of workers in a
52
particular classification on similar construction. The final revised
regulation defines the prevailing wage, where there is no single rate
paid to a majority of workers in a particular classification on similar
53
construction in the locality, as the average rate. The regulation also
explicitly prohibits the use of metropolitan area wage survey data in
issuing a wage determination for a rural area (and vice versa).
Further, under some circumstances, it excludes Federal projects
from the wage base in setting prevailing wages.
The third issue-weekly submission of payroll recordsimposed substantial paperwork burdens on contractors, while
contributing little to the enforcement of the Act. The new regulation
eliminates the old requirement that the contractor submit weekly
payrolls, 54 but retains the requirement that the contractor submit a
certified "Statement of Compliance" every week, as required by the
47. Estimates of these excess costs have been placed as high as one billion dollars.
48. Labor Standards Provisions Applicable To Contracts Covering Federally Financed
And Assisted Construction (Also Labor Standards Provisions Applicable To Nonconstruction
Contracts Subject To The Contract Work Hours And Safety Standards Act) 46 Fed. Reg. 41,463
(1981) (to be codified at 29 C.F. R. Part 5) (hereinafter cited as Labor Standards Provisions Act).
49. Procedures for Predetermination of wage Rates, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,445 (1981) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1).
50. Labor Standards Provisions Act, supra, note 48 at 41,462.
51. Id. at 41,463.
52. Only if no single rate was paid to at least 30 percent of the workers in an occupation In
a locality did the Department set the average rate as the prevailing rate.
53. Procedures for Predetermination of Wage Rates, supra, note 49 at 41,445.
54. Labor Standards Provisions Act, supra note 48 at 41,462-63.
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Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act. 55 Agencies are permitted, however,
to request submissions of payrolls when there is a specific compliance
check underway.
ProposedChanges in OFCCP
Within the Department of Labor, the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs has the day-to-day responsibility for enforcing
the executive order which prohibits discrimination in employment
and requires affirmative actions to ensure equal treatment of all
56
applicants and employees.
A review of the enforcement of this program showed that it was
not working as effectively or efficiently as it should. The program has
had an impact in promoting greater employment of women and
minorities but, because it was run in a highly adversarial manner, it
produced excessive paperwork, caused aggravation, and engendered
contempt among contractors and the general public for the entire
affirmative action concept.
OFCCP has proposed revisions in the regulations and has moved
to renew the emphasis on voluntary compliance by contractors. 57 It
has sought to reverse the attitude of confrontation which weakened
compliance capability. OFCCP now meets regularly with "Liaison
Committees" formed by business and special interest groups and
other organizations. These groups provide a forum for the exchange of
technical compliance information and promote greater understanding
of compliance problems. In this new spirit of cooperation, greater
voluntary compliance with affirmative action policies should be
achieved.
The proposed OFCCP regulations follow two basic premises. 58
First, the contractual requirement to undertake affirmative action is
not to be compromised. Second, unnecessary and costly paperwork is
to be reduced. An illustration of these two premises in action is
OFCCP's proposal to change only one of the two "thresholds" of
supply and service contractor coverage. Currently, OFCCP has
jurisdiction over those contractors who have $10,000 or more in
contracts. 59 Such contractors are prohibited from discrimination in
employment and also are required to engage in affirmative action.
OFCCP does not propose to change this basic anti-discrimination and
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276C (1978).
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
46 Fed. Reg. 42,968 (1981).
Id. at 42,976.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a) (1981).
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60
affirmative action threshold in any way. What is proposed is to
change the second threshold relating to the preparation of written
affirmative action programs (AAPs). Currently, contractors with 50 or
more employees and with contracts of $50,000 or more are required
6
to develop a detailed written AAP. 1 These AAPs contain elaborate
analyses in which the contractor determines whether minorities and
women are being "under utilized" in the workforce. They are lengthy
documents which are costly for the contractor to prepare and for
OFCCP to review. Their meaning is insignificant to contractors with
few workers. Without changing the basic obligations of supply and
service contractors, OFCCP proposes to reduce this costly paperwork
by eliminating the written AAP annual report requirement for
contractors with less than 250 employees and contracts under $1
million. 62
The Department estimated that these proposed levels would
reduce the number of companies required to submit written AAPs by
75 percent-from approximately 17,000 companies to approximately
4,100.63 These new threshold levels would maintain coverage for
nearly 77 percent of the 26 million employees currently covered by
AAPs. 64 Special efforts would be taken to review companies which fall
below the threshold levels for purposes of preparing an AAP, but
which are still subject to the Executive Order.

CONCLUSION

The key to understanding these examples is that they
simultaneously seek to address problems requiring federal intervention, while allowing for the maximum interplay between employers
and employees. This interaction of employer-employee relationships
promotes regulatory flexibility which can reduce the compliance and
cost burden on both parties, while maintaining the efficacy of the
standard. Indeed, if anything, the less burdensome regulations
should produce better results because employers and employees will
be encouraged to join in a mutual effort to achieve the goals of
regulation rather than simply being directed to comply.
The implications of generalizing this approach to other areas of
labor law are profound. It does not herald a reduction of the federal
60. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,975 (1981).
61. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a) (1981). Holders of Government bills of lading totalling $50,000
in a 12-month period, depositories of Federal finds, and issuing and paying agents on U.S.
Savings Bonds and notes are also subject to the written AAP requirement. Id. at 42,979.
62. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,978 (1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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presence in appropriate areas of labor law. Rather, it will lead to a
strengthenifig of the foundations of labor relations between
employers and employees. Only in this way can we avoid the
ossification of our system of labor relations, leaving us with a set of
inflexible rules promulgated and understood only by lawyers. Our
goal can and must be to reverse this process and to return to a system
which, again, relies more heavily on the collective bargaining
process. Such a system, with an appropriate role for federal
regulations, has served us well as a mechanism to resolve disputes
and allocate economic rewards. The federal regulatory process itself
should seek to utilize the bargaining process to the greatest extent
possible, thereby allowing for the most efficient and flexible way to
achieve essential regulatory goals.
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